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FACTORS AFFECTING JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY

by

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This thesis describes the most important factors that influence the process of Japanese defense policy formulation. The questions posed include; 1)What will Japan's role be in the emerging international security structure? 2) What internal factord affecting defense policy need to be better understood by U.S. policy makers? 3) What are some implications of the decision-making process and political situation in Japan for the U.S.? The national debate in Japan about defense is analyzed with a description of the major advocacy groups, as well as the influence of the press and public opinion. Political, historical, and social forces are examined, as well as the Japanese defense policy-making process. The thesis also examines the Japanese response to the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, to gain a current perspective on Japanese attitude toward defense and security issues. Conclusions are drawn to answer the initial questions and to propose what the U.S. may expect from Japan in the area of defense matters in the future.

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Factors Affecting Japanese Defense Policy

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ABSTRACT

This Thesis describes many of the important factors influencing the process of Japanese defense policy formulation. The questions posed include 1) What will Japan's Role be in the emerging international security structure? 2) What internal factors affecting defense policy need to be better understood by U.S. policy makers? 3) What are some implications of the decision-making process and political situation in Japan for the U.S.? The national debate in Japan about defense is analyzed with a description of the major advocacy groups, as well as the influence of the press and public opinion. Political, historical, and social forces are examined, as well as the Japanese defense policy-making process. The thesis also examines the Japanese response to the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, to gain a current perspective on Japanese attitude toward defense and security issues. Conclusions are drawn to answer the initial questions and to propose what the U.S. may expect from Japan in the Area of defense matters in the future.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

One of the most pressing and challenging problems facing defense programmers today is that of understanding the complex relationship between Japan and the United States in matters of defense burdensharing. These problems no longer concern just the defense of Japan and the security of the western Pacific, they are now problems of global proportions as both countries move toward new roles in the international economic and security community. The United States, while still the premier world military and economic superpower, has lost relative economic advantage and influence in many portions of the world. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the western Pacific. Japan has emerged from the war recovery years as a vibrant and powerful economic force creating the backbone of the western Pacific sphere of economic influence.

The U.S. is in a period of transition as the post-Cold War world begins to take shape. The decrease in relative U.S. economic leverage and strength is necessitating a reassessment of the U.S. role in committing defense resources throughout the world for the protection of world security and economic interests. Some observers question whether the security arrangements created out of the ashes of the second world war

are still appropriate and equitable in the present world situation.

The "Japanese miracle" of unprecedented economic growth and development has produced an indisputable economic superpower. Japan's economic influence is felt throughout the globe as a supplier in essentially every major market for manufactured goods and as a major buyer of industrial raw materials as well as agricultural and energy products. Japan has penetrated many markets traditionally dominated by American industry forcing the U.S. to struggle to recapture the competitive edge in many basic industries. The pillars of Japanese strength are import/export activities, allowing its highly developed industrial base to add value to raw materials bought abroad. Freedom of trade and access to widespread international markets are thus vital to the continued viability and growth of the Japanese economy.

Japan's international influence and interests extend well beyond import/export markets and trade. Japan is the world's largest lender nation, holding fully one third of all outstanding international loans while the U.S. holds less than one fifth. [Ref. 1:p. 2] Its international economic activities are so extensive that nearly any conflict, anywhere in the world could directly threaten Japanese investment and economic interests.

This puts Japan in a position very similar to that of the U.S., which has found that intervention is often necessary in

regional disputes to ensure the stability of economic interests. Japan's position does, however, differ in that it lacks the military establishment, internal political will and the international consent to be an influential participant in external military matters. In the post war era Japan has become a nation that is at once an economic power and a military dependant of the U.S.

There are many reasons for this situation, not the least of which is the influence that the U.S. has had in Japan in concert with domestic affairs and politics.

> Japan's defense policy is the reflection of the overall U.S.-Japanese relationship, in which the United States figures as a superordinate power. However this condition alone does not explain Japan's external conduct, which the Japanese liken to medieval Venice, an unarmed merchant state. Beginning with the U.S. occupation Japan's domestic institutions have been altered and adapted to the nation's external conditions with the support or acquiescence of the Japanese themselves. Japan's external conduct results from the interaction of America's Japan policy and Japan's own domestic politics. It was Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida who blended the two to produce today's Japan with all of its strengths and weaknesses. [Ref. 1:p. 9]

The Japanese military establishment is the product of U.S. pressure to establish a viable defense of the Japanese homeland primarily from the threat of invasion by the Soviet Union. Japan now possesses one of the world's largest militaries in dollar terms. However, the effectiveness of this force to carry out even its basic mission is continually questioned. Even though the Japanese have invested heavily in some of the world's best, most technically advanced military equipment, many argue that they have failed to establish the

logistical or command and control structure required to sustain any kind of meaningful, theater-wide anti-invasion operation.

In recent years questions have been raised by many in the world community regarding the appropriateness of Japan's commitment in both resources and principle to its own defense and to world security and stability. Various bodies of opinion suggest that the lessons of World War Two are well understood and appreciated and that we are faced with a new Japan that is ready to take its place in the world community of peace-seeking nations and thus bear a reasonable and equitable burden of maintaining the security of this community. This issue has continued to become more emotional and has been especially intensified by Japans's reluctance to participate in the recent Iraqi conflict.

While the world community, and especially the U.S., put pressure on the Japanese to make greater contributions to its own defense and world-wide defense efforts, it is important for those outside of Japan to fully understand the forces at work within Japan to shape the policies they see in practice. Full consideration of the current Japanese situation reveals that there exist significant barriers to increasing Japan's commitment to defense.

The objective of this study is to identify and analyze the internal factors within Japan which together act to influence and shape the current Japanese policy on defense and security

matters. U.S. policy makers and defense planners will need this information as they deal with the Japanese in negotiations and in programming the U.S. resources that should be committed to the defense of Japan and the western Pacific.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The western Pacific will continue to be an area of significant strategic importance well into the next century. The increasing economic influence and importance of the region will make it a major factor in the world security picture. The potential for conflict and instability in the region, while apparently decreased as a result of world-wide Soviet threat reduction, is still significant and will require continued commitment of defense resources for well into the foreseeable future. For this reason several important questions in three key areas will need to be addressed as the U.S. seeks to develop a long range security policy for the region.

1. Japan's Role

What will be Japan's role in the security structure of the western Pacific? What role does the U.S. want that role to be? How does this role perceived by the U.S. differ from that perceived by the Japanese Government or by the Japanese people? What historical, political and geo-strategic forces are at work to define the role that Japan will most likely assume?

2. Internal Factors

To what extent do constitutional, governmental or procedural issues impede Japan's formulation of a more participatory defense policy? What are the internal political and social forces influencing defense policy? To what extent are these trends likely to continue?

3. U.S. Implications

Finally, what are the implications of this process of Japanese defense policy formulation for the U.S.? What should defense planners and decision makers appreciate about this process and how should it affect decision making in the U.S?

The United States and Japan are world powers and world partners whose political, economic, social and cultural ties continue to multiply and strengthen. There is little doubt that U.S.-Japanese cooperation is vital to the economic well-being of the entire world. The issue of defense burdensharing, which in the past has been, to some extent, an area of frustration in U.S-Japanese relations, will be resolved only when these superpowers fully understand and appreciate their respective positions and the difficulties involved in altering those positions. While this study will not eliminate the communication or understanding gap, it may be able to shed some light on some of the areas that could help lead to an atmosphere of increased understanding as these two nations

seek to establish a security relationship that is both mutually beneficial and equitable.

II. FORCES AT WORK IN JAPANESE SOCIETY

A. THE PEACE CONSTITUTION

Since World War Two, the most powerful and enduring factor influencing Japanese attitude toward defense and security issues has been, without question, Article Nine of the "Peace Constitution." The Constitution was drafted by General MacArther and offered to the Japanese officials with the assurance that their acceptance of it would allow the continuation of the imperial monarchy as long as true sovereignty was transferred to the people through the creation of a parliamentary type government headed by a Prime Minister. Article IX reads as follows.

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means for settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

1. Occupation

During the first years of the U.S. occupation of Japan, General MacArther set in motion the major forces which would dominate Japanese policy for at least the next forty years. First was the creation and ratification of the new Japanese constitution. Second were the sweeping reforms

initiated to affect the "purge of existing political forces on the one hand and the unleashing of the left wing on the other." Also, with MacArther's blessing the Japanese Socialist party was founded and the communists were liberated from jail. [Ref. 1: p.11] MacArther hoped that the seeds of revolution would be sown and that the results would be a democratic, coalition government favorable toward the United States. However, in 1947-48 the U.S. made a radical reversal in Japanese policy. Now Japan was seen as an important potential ally in the containment strategy evolving with the advent of the Cold War. The reforms initiated by MacArther were substituted for a policy to try to shape Japan into the political, diplomatic and, to a certain extent, the military power that would meet the needs of the new strategy. This new direction eventually led to the creation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance which has provided the foundation for U.S.-Japanese defense relations ever since.

2. Interpretation

Most of the tension and frustration in Japanese domestic and foreign policy since World War Two have been as a result of the paradox created by the switch in U.S. policy during the occupation. Immediately following the war, amid the wreckage of a country ravaged and conquered at an incredibly high cost, the U.S. was anxious to ensure that the Japanese militarism would never menace the world again. In effect, the

U.S. stripped the Japanese nation of the legal right to exist as an independent entity able to defend itself and control its destiny. The Japanese, beaten and desperate to cling, at least in part, to their imperial past, reluctantly accepted the constitution to prevent its demise.

When the realities of the Cold War bore down on the U.S. it became apparent that, while it sounded good in 1945, the U.S. written constitution did not fit the needs of a bona fide nation in the international community. However, by this time the constitution had a large constituency led by the Socialist party. Although the U.S. along with conservatives of the LDP sought to revise the constitution they have been and continue to be unsuccessful. [Ref. 1: p. 11-12]

The outbreak of the Korean War gave the U.S. and the revisionists the first chance to broaden the interpretation of the constitution to include the legal right of Japan to raise forces for the sole purpose of defending the Japanese homeland from attack. It was then that General MacArther, in spite of his aggressive and continual defense of the peace constitution which he had drafted, ordered the creation of the first units of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). Within the atmosphere of the ever heightening tensions of the Cold War the U.S. saw in Japan an important potential anti-communist ally. Thus, through the years, with continual pressure, the U.S. has been able to influence Japan, to create, bit by bit, the world's third largest military force in dollar terms, in

spite of a continual anti-military consensus in the population.

3. The Constitution Today

The question remains; What does article IX really mean and what are its true implications today? To the majority of the Japanese people it is a constant reminder of the carnage of World War Two and a promise that Japan would never be found in a similar position. To others it is a stumbling block slowing the progression of Japan in the international community and to many Americans and others outside Japan it is a facade behind which Japan can hide, shirking legitimate responsibility.

Through the years the revisionist movement has lost most of its momentum. The Constitution is a part of the Japanese life and mind-set that provides, to a certain extent a stabilizing force in Japanese politics.

> ....revisionists,no matter how irate at having to live with the "MacArther constitution," recognize that the balance of political power makes the amending of the constitution a political impossibility. The Socialist party, for its part, finds it increasingly difficult to rally support in the name of the "peace constitution" which the Japanese public, if not its political leadership, now takes largely for granted.
>
> The basic law, drafted nearly thirty (now forty six) years ago under the guidance of American Occupation authorities, is now so widely accepted by the public as setting the legitimate and appropriate framework for conduction the nation's affairs that it is not possible for politicians to rally support on either side of the revisionist issue. [Ref. 2: p. 56,57]

It is easy to mistake the increased competition and, in some cases, confusion in Japanese politics for instability. However, there exists an inherent stability in the system due partly to a high level of social and ethnic unity in Japan, partly to the doubts that major changes would improve Japan's security or economic position and partly by the almost universally held view that the constitution is compatible with Japanese traditions and interests.[Ref. 2: p. 57]

Japanese culture and history is characterized by centuries of feudal conflicts. Much of the conflict was very subtle, at a constant and low level of intensity meant to wear down the opponent while slowly broadening ones's own interests and influence. This conflict exists today as well. No longer are the warring parties rival clans or lords. They are now government ministries and parties and factions within the parties. [Ref. 13: p. 24]

B. THE NATIONAL DEBATE

Through the nineteen fifties and sixties the Japanese government adopted the policy of totally basing its security on the U.S.-Japan security treaty, building only a very small self-defense force. After 1975, there began to grow in Japan a perception of a change in the balance of superpower military capability. As a result, widely differing views on Japan's best course for the future began to emerge. The main participants in the debate were government officials, military

experts, strategists, policy analysts, and journalists. The debate defined four main arguments and six main advocacy groups; the realists, the diplomats, the progressive conservatives, the nuclear advocates, the mercantilists and the strategists. [Ref. 1: p. 25]

1. Major Advocacy Groups and Their Views

a. The Realists

In the view of the realists, the balance of military power has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union and that since Japan is so closely allied and dependent on the U.S. for its security this makes Japan less secure. Thus, Japan has had no choice but to improve its own defense systems to make them a credible deterrent in their own right. One great concern expressed by this group was that in the event of a major U.S.-Soviet confrontation, the soviets would seek to neutralize Japan much as it would Norway and Sweden in an effort to create a perimeter of defense.

Many military analysts, Japanese and foreign, began expressing the view that the SDF presented little credible defense capability. In 1978, Osamu Kaihara, chief secretariat of the National Defense Council publicly stated that the SDF "absolutely could not last even 24 hours" due to the vulnerability of the fixed radar sites and air bases at Chitose and Misawa. This dismal assessment of the SDF's

capabilities was shared by many military analysts who also expressed the view that the Japanese public had not been adequately educated as to the importance of maintaining an adequate defense system.

Also the buildup of Soviet Military capability in the western Pacific, specifically the stationing of a good portion of the Soviet western fleet in Cam Ranh Bay along with the increased demands being placed on the U.S. seventh fleet by the situations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf led to the commonly held belief that the U.S. could only act in a sea-denial rather than a sea-control role in the western Pacific.

The realists solution was to modernize and expand the SDF to assist the American forces in providing air and sea surveillance up to a 1000NM perimeter around Japan including the Straights of Malacca. This could only be achieved by expanding the Maritime SDF to 60 escort ships and by obtaining advanced Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes. [Ref. 1: pp. 26,27]

b. The Diplomats

The diplomats are those former bureaucrats and politicians not convinced that the security of Japan is in peril. They express the opinion that Japan should concentrate its efforts in gaining international acceptance through a vigorous foreign aid program coupled with innovative,

proactive diplomacy to promote peace and human rights around the world. Indeed, they propose, if this type of strategy could lead to a more peaceful, stable and prosperous world there would be no possible threat to Japanese security and thus, no need for increasing the size or strength of the SDF.[Ref. 1: p. 28]

This statement by Kiichi Miyazawa, an LDP party leader in 1984 illustrates the diplomats' point of view;

> .....the road which Japan, an economic superpower, has been walking ... should be the best model for disarmament. No better model can be found, even if we search throughout history. I firmly believe that a successful walk down this road with confidence will contribute greatly to the international current of disarmament. I think we should advocate this whenever there is an opportunity, and the resources for any excessive military buildup should at least be directed to assisting the developing countries...We should proceed in the direction of making the maximum contribution in non-military fields and in taking the initiative in cooperating through peaceful activities by giving the utmost assistance to developing countries, being more active in various UN activities, taking the initiative in large development projects on an international scale. [Ref. 25: p. 94]

c. The Progressive Conservatives

The Progressive Conservatives, led mainly by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) have established the strategy of maintaining the status-quo on defense matters and nurturing the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance depending heavily on the pacifist principles established and legitimized in Article IX. The conservatives view emerged out of the disillusion of war and the revulsion of Japanese nationalism that had led to the

war. They fuel their view along with a deep distrust of traditional state power. The basis of their stance is the support of the post-war democratic order, the new constitution and the role that it created for Japan in the new world order which was to show to the rest of the world that "a modern, industrialized nation could exist without arming itself." [Ref. 5: p. 235-236]

> The Japanese people, having been victimized by a reactionary leadership that indoctrinated them in an artificial nationalism, had shown the demented course of the modern nation-state by its aggression in Asia. As victims of the advent of atomic weapons, the Japanese people could argue convincingly that wars were ever more destructive, that the new age of international affairs was accordingly at hand and the sovereign prerogative to go to war must be renounced. No other nation embraced the liberal hope of the future world order with the enthusiasm of Japan, for no other nation's recent experiences seemed to bear out so compellingly the cost of the old ways. [Ref. 5: p.236]

This position gained strong public support during the early post-war years since it provided the Japanese some feeling of expiation for the war debacle and also provided justification for concentrating all national energies to rebuilding the nation and the economy. However by the seventies it was apparent that the new world order was not to come to pass, that power politics played an ever more important role in the life of Japan and its widespread interests. Thus, those identifying most with the progressive viewpoint have in recent years shifted to a more moderate, somewhat conservative stance.

During the seventies the perception that the balance of superpower military power was moving in favor of the Soviets led the conservatives to fear that any attempt by Japan to compensate for the relative decrease in U.S. strength would cause the Soviets to accelerate their military buildup in the western Pacific. Thus, preventing military spending from exceeding the 1% o GNP cap became the cornerstone of conservative strategy. [Ref. 1: p. 30-31]

d. The Nuclear Advocates

The nuclear advocates believe that Japan has outgrown the mistakes of the period leading up to and during World War Two and, therefore, propose that every effort should be made to match Japan's international economic influence with political and military influence. They believe that Japan is ready to act responsibly as a full participant in the world community of nations in all respects, leaving behind the stigma of dependency in military and security matters.

The nuclear advocates believe that the decline of U.S. domination places the Japanese homeland at peril and nuclear weapons are seen as providing the cheapest and quickest means for Japan to establish a credible retaliatory threat in an effort to deter aggression against the Japanese homeland. [Ref. 1: p. 32-33] One of the most energetic proponents of this point of view has been Shimizu Ikutaro who writes;

> On the one hand, Japan must encourage friendly relations with America, the Soviet Union and all other countries, but at the same time we must not forget for an instant that Japan is alone. In the end we can only rely on Japan and the Japanese.....If Japan acquired the military power commensurate with its economic power countries that fully appreciate the meaning of military power would not overlook this. They would defer; they would act with caution and in time they would show respect.....even though they (the nuclear powers) do not use their weapons, (they) are able to instill fear in those countries that do not have them. A country like Japan that does not possess nuclear weapons and is afraid of them will be easy game for the nuclear powers. Putting political pressure on Japan will be like twisting a baby's arm. [Ref. 5: p. 241]

The nuclear option is proposed in varying scenarios ranging from the domestic production, control and deployment to that of following the West German example of obtaining nuclear warheads from the U.S. to be mounted on Japanese delivery systems or possibly the stationing of U.S. nuclear forces in Japan.

Shimuzu, as a "respected intellectual and theoretician of postwar progressivism" sent shock waves through Japan with his essay for its candor and obvious apostasy from the long accepted status quo. His constant confrontation with the "contradictions and incongruities that trouble Japan's postwar order" illicite sharp emotional criticism from many sectors of Japanese society, especially from the progressives and to a lessor extent the realists. [Ref. 5: p. 241] This new nationalist sentiment does exist, however, and must be taken into account in any attempt to understand the full spectrum of the defense debate.

e. The Mercantilists

The mercantilists distinguish their view through a practical analysis of Japan's natural resources, geopolitical position and economic structure. This leads to the conclusion that Japan's role is defined as a great trading nation, wielding power and influence and basing its world-wide prestige on the power of its trade and commerce, much like Venice and the Netherlands of the past. [Ref. 5: p. 238] In reality this picture of Japan resembles most closely the actual path that Japan has followed since the War. In 1975 Masataka Kosaka, one of Japan's most influential political scientists in an article written for the Journal *Chuo Koron* in November, 1975, described his view of his nation's national purpose. Japan, in his view, should act the role as merchant in the world community, a middleman taking advantage of commercial relations and avoiding involvement in international politics. He writes;

> A trading nation does not go to war, neither does it make supreme efforts to bring peace. It simply takes advantage of international relations created by stronger nations. This can also be said of our economic activities. In the most basic sense, we do not create things. We live by purchasing primary products and semifinished products and processing them. That is to say that we live by utilizing other people's production.

Kosaka points out that this role is not a popular one in the international community. It causes problems particularly with the U.S. because "Japan has enjoyed both the advantages and disadvantages of being an ally and the benefits

of noninvolvement." As international politics and economics become more and more intertwined Kosaka foresees more problems for Japan unless it is able to manage its "crisis of spirit." By which he means to hold firm to "no clear principles, but merely pursuing commercial advantage." He identifies the major danger as the possibility that the Japanese people may lose their self respect. [Ref. 5: p. 239]

Another strong argument was offered by Amaya Naohiro, the former Vice Minister of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Amaya draws from Japanese history to create a metaphor to represent present-day Japan in the world community. He likens the world to Tokugawa Japan in which society was divided into four functional classes; the samurai, peasants, artisans and the merchants. The present day samurai are the U.S. and the USSR, the third world the peasants and Japan the merchants. In the sixteenth century the merchants acted shrewdly and adroitly, disciplined to pursue their fortunes while being dominated by the samurai and among the war and turmoil of the time.

> By the end of the Tokugawa period, Amaya points out, merchants were so powerful that Honda Toshiaki remarked, "In appearance all of Japan belongs to the Samurai, but in reality it is owned by the merchants." What is required is to stay the course, to put aside the samurai's pride of principle, and to cultivate the tradesman's information-gathering and planning ability, his tact and art of flattery. [Ref. 5: p.239-240]

Amaya believes that Japan needs to accept the role that the post war order has carved out for it, exercising the

discipline to not waver even in the face of criticism from within and abroad. However he also acknowledges along with Kosaka that as American power declines and Japanese interests become more global it will become more important for Japan to be more cooperative in ensuring the security interests of industrial democracies since it is no longer so easy to separate economics and politics. [Ref. 5: p. 240]

f. The Strategists

The strategists recognize that Japan's most imminent threat to national security is the Soviet Union. They cite the geo-political and historical evidence along with Russian national interest for the basis for their concern. However, for the most part they do not favor a buildup of Japanese military strength to counter the Soviet threat in south-east Asia. Instead, they support the status quo with efforts on the margins to increase Japanese influence in diplomatic and economic circles.

The strategists express the need to nurture the existing U.S.-Japanese security alliance by increasing Japan's combat support, antisubmarine and airborne surveillance roles. This, however, must be achieved without offending or alarming the Soviets which could lead to further Soviet expansionism in the region, much like the experience of the seventies which was felt to be caused largely by the increased U.S. presence and Chinese military buildup. [Ref. 1: p. 33-34]

Like the diplomats, the strategists also support increasing Japanese aid to developing and third world economies. They acknowledge Japan's status as an international economic power and as such is in a unique and desirable position, capable of making a significant contribution to world peace and cooperation by working toward improving economic conditions world-wide. It would be important for Japan to make continued and energetic diplomatic efforts to promote peace and stability which would increase its own security by reducing potential threats and the probability of foreign aggression against Japan or any of her international interests.

While not completely inclusive, these groups represent the bulk of the official and public sentiments toward defense and security. Their views, while varied tend to reduce to four main arguments or positions on defense.

First, the SDF is generally accepted as a necessary evil but neutralism and pacifism continue to be strong factors in the opposition parties. This pacifism grew directly out of the U.S. occupation of Japan. Even though it is deeply grounded in a large part of the populace it will likely not survive long if the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship deteriorates. [Ref. 1: p. 37]

The Second view places at its center the peace constitution which established the precedent for the U.S. to protect Japan allowing emphasis to be shifted toward domestic

economic development. MacArthur, determined to see that Japan was disarmed forever at all costs and Yoshida, willing to allow MacArthur's doctrine to take hold and grow in post-war Japan set the stage for the "economy first" doctrine while allowing the U.S. to bear the bulk of defense burden. This is the view that has prevailed since the occupation and has been perpetuated by Prime Minister Yoshida and the conservatives. This argument has led to the establishment in 1976 of the one percent cap on defense spending, contributing to and cooperating with the U.S. in defense and diplomatic efforts, always in a supporting and following role, not striking out as a leader.

The third view is that of the mercantilists who see Japan as having carved out a niche in the world order as the unarmed power, wielding influence via economics and seeking to have Japan simply accept that role and pursue it with singularity of purpose.

The fourth view held primarily by the nuclear advocates and some of the realists proposes that Japan take a more significant role in all aspects of world affairs by developing a powerful military and that it deal with the rest of the world on a basis of equality and full cooperation on all fronts. This view is the farthest from the status quo and from the heart and mind of the majority of the Japanese people. However, its advocates do exist and are part of the forces being exerted on defense policy in Japan.

C. THE PRESS AND ITS INFLUENCE

The Japanese press system, one of the world's most extensive, with over 125 nationwide newspapers with a combined circulation of over 68 million copies has long exerted considerable influence over the minds and policies of Japanese government officials. It appears to have failed however, to sway public opinion drastically in security issues in the post-war period. Its position has instead lagged behind public sentiment, slowly shifting from a unified advocacy group for the far left, conciliatory to the PRC and the Soviet Union and critical of the Japanese and U.S. governments to a more divided, more moderate group, more representative of mainstream Japanese public opinion.

The historically "dovish" position of the press can, to some extent, be explained by its history. The first newspapers in Japan were founded during the Meiji restoration of 1868. From their beginning their role has been that of "government critic" endeavoring to enlighten the people of Japan, showing them how Japan should be modernized. Often, governments trying to control the damage in public opinion created by the press would use the security police in an attempt to stifle it. However the press remained somewhat independent until the nineteen thirties when the militarist government imposed complete censorship.

The journalists' failure to fight the government's control of the press in the pre-war Japan years left them with a sense of guilt. they felt that if they had only

> fought harder, they might have been able to prevent Japan from getting involved in an un-winnable war. This feeling persists today. [Ref. 3: p.46]

Thus, much of the zeal the press has for the pacifist ideal stems from a desire not to make the same mistakes again by allowing the government a free hand.

The hostility toward the Japanese government and especially with the U.S.-Japanese security alliance was most aggressive and critical during the nineteen fifties and sixties when the major papers attacked the government for dragging its heels in normalizing relations with the PRC and in settling the Northern Islands territorial dispute with the Soviet Union.

During this period the press reported on Chinese and Soviet issues in conciliatory manner, down playing the possible threat to Japanese security posed by both of these neighboring giants. Fear of offending Chinese communist authorities prevented the press from even printing a report of the downfall of Lin Pao. In 1975 *Asahi Shimbun* refused to report riots in Hangchow in which 200,000 workers battled government troops for months in defiance of the government.

Japanese press coverage of the Vietnam war also has been criticized as being biased misrepresentative. the Japanese press corps in Vietnam never referred to the anti-Saigon troops as communists, using instead the term "liberation troops." They reported that the struggle in the south had been "spontaneously originated only among the people of the south,"

and that only weapons and no troops had been sent from the north when overwhelming evidence existed that troops as well as material were being sent from the north to support the war. [Ref. 1: pp. 42-43]

During the seventies the Japanese press rallied around the one percent defense spending ceiling, continuing attacks on the government's security and defense policies. In November, 1970, for example a *Sankei Shimbun* editorial stated the following;

> Taking all if these circumstances in consideration, we cannot but feel that the SDF's are only trying to keep pace with the armed forces of other countries without studying a proper upper limit or re-examining their own foundations. We think that an attitude of the Self Defense Forces has caused misunderstanding both at home and abroad.

A change in the attitude of the press began to become evident in the late seventies as a result of four specific developments; 1) the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories. 2) the growth and strengthening of the Soviet Western Fleet. 3) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 4) the apparent decline in U.S. power, prestige and influence following the Watergate Scandal and the withdrawal from Vietnam. *Asahi* and *Mainchi* have remained left of center. However, *Yomuri, Sankei* and *Nihon Keizai* acknowledged and expressed concern over the Soviet military actions and buildup. [Ref. 1: pp. 42-49]

The public has been less openly critical on the issue of security matters. Public polls have shown that from the

nineteen fifties through the early seventies most Japanese favored the maintenance of a small military force along with the preservation Article IX of the constitution. The approval for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance has varied dramatically through the years from a high of 80% in the early fifties to a low of 20% in 1960. Approval for the treaty slowly grew through the sixties to about 33% in 1970. [Ref. 1: p. 45]

It is thus apparent that the press was unable to influence the public to disapprove of the SDF's through the years of their most significant growth. Also, anti-American sentiment espoused by the press did not translate directly into anti-American public opinion. Even without majority support for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance Japanese public support for the U.S. remained strong with only a slight 6 to 8% disapproval rating.

Still, the Japanese media remains a powerful force in Japanese society discouraging increased defense spending, basing its position mostly upon the fear of resurgence of the militarism which led to the disaster of World War Two.

> It is fashionable to be antimilitarist in Japan today... ..... The Japanese cannot really get serious about defense because of the structure of their alliance, of which the Americans are the mainstay. This structure rests on the assumption that a rearmed Japan would be a menace to its neighbors..... Japan's media retain the bogey of Japanese militarism and put it to good use. To exhort the Japanese to spend more on defense will be futile as long as America stands in awe of that bogey.[Ref. 1: p.52]

III. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY MAKING

In November, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford made the first visit ever of an American president, in office, to Japan. During this visit he addressed the Japanese Emperor saying, "Let us continue to seek understanding with each other and among all peoples. Let us work together, to solve common problems, recognizing the interdependence of the modern world in which we all live." [Ref. 6: p. 91] Mutual understanding was the theme of that presidential visit and it continues to be of paramount importance in all aspects of U.S.-Japanese relations including the area of defense policy making.

Through the years since this initial presidential visit both countries have made efforts with varying degrees of success to understand and appreciate the intricacies, possibilities and limitations of each other's policy making system. One such effort in the U. S. took place in 1982 when the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs convened a workshop in Washington entitled "Government Decisionmaking in Japan: Implications for the United States."

In this workshop, the participants (Members of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Scholars and the Congressional Research Service) acknowledged that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan was one of the most important in the world at the time. This thought has also been expressed by other very influential individuals such as the former Ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, who defined The U.S.-Japanese relationship as "America's most important bilateral relationship, bar none." [Ref. 13: p. 259] It was also acknowledged that international security conditions in the world were changing and that these changes could exert a major impact on this relationship. The emergence of Japan as a dominant world economic power, a growing Soviet military presence in the western Pacific, trade frictions between the U.S. and Japan and declining U.S. power were just a few of the issues facing the two nations. Also noted was the fact that significant progress had been made in adjusting the U.S. Japan relationship to conform to the needs of the times. Unfortunately though, much of the progress had not come as a result of quiet and congenial diplomatic interchange. It had instead often been affected by "heavy-handed U.S. pressure" leading to highly contentious negotiations between high level government officials. The Americans for the most part felt frustrated over the amount of pressure that had to be applied and energy expended in order to achieve even minimal results. [Ref. 10: pp.VII-VIII] The main questions posed at the workshop were;

- "How do the Japanese reach decisions on foreign economic and defense issues important to the United States?"
- "How can the United States more effectively influence Japanese policy in directions favorable to U.S. interests?"

There was general agreement at the workshop that Americans needed to become more skillful and knowledgeable about the japanese system in order to become more effective in negotiations with the Japanese and to prevent eroding the solid foundation of trust that had been the basis of U.S.-Japanese relations throughout the post-war years. [Ref. 10: p.VII]

A. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM

1. The Roots of Japanese Policy Making

a. *"The Truncated Pyramid"*

Prior to World War Two the Japanese political system, was an Emperor state set up under the Meiji constitution with the Emperor holding supreme and unified power. In reality, however, the bulk of the real policy making and implementation was done by the powerful ministries within the bureaucratic structure of the government. The most powerful of these ministries were the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of War. Though he would occasionally express his views on matters of state, rarely did the Emperor intervene in the establishment or execution of foreign policy.[Ref. 11: p. 120]

The Prime Minister and his cabinet could exert little influence over many matters, especially those pertaining to military or foreign affairs due to a doctrine of independence of the supreme command which placed those matters outside the competence of the cabinet. This created a system of government in which the top leaders actually held much less control over important decisions than their positions would indicate. This situation has been called a "Truncated Pyramid." [Ref. 7: p. 118]

Postwar Japan saw the Emperor assume a purely symbolic role with the Prime Minister recognized as the legitimate head of the government. While the postwar prime ministers enjoy more power than their prewar predecessors, they still have been significantly more constrained in policy setting than other democratic heads of state. Thus, to a certain extent, the truncated pyramid persists in modern Japan. [Ref. 7: p. 119]

The Japanese Prime Minister who comes to power as a faction leader in the LDP must rely on continual support from his own as well as other factions in the LDP and business leaders for financial support. Unlike his American counterpart who serves for a fixed term, his term could end at any time when the consensus support in his party and business erodes. Thus, the Japanese prime Minister will often shy away from making bold policy decisions for fear of losing constituency. Every move is made only after an exhaustive effort to

determine the consensus in the party, in business and in the bureaucracy. [Ref. 7: p.120]

b. Japanese Democracy

The LDP came to power in the Diet and the Prime Minister's office in 1955 and has been in power ever since. In 1955 the party was, for the most part, led by old prewar bureaucrats who came to power as a matter of convenience. The postwar government's priority was to affect economic and social reforms. The experienced bureaucrats were the most qualified to lead the party and the government through the period of reform. The opposition parties mounted an ideological campaign in an effort to undermine support for the conservative LDP. But, as the public's concern turned to personal economic welfare, opposition party support has never been sufficient to end the rule of the LDP. Since 1955 the LDP has become a "conglomerate of mini-parties." The Prime Minister is chosen out of a consensus of these mini-parties. The intraparty conflicts associated with Prime Minister selection have become increasingly bitter through the years.[Ref. 11: p. 120] The goal of the American occupation authorities following the war was, in effect, to democratize Japan. Early in the occupation MacArther's General Headquarters of the Allied Forces abolished many of the powerful prewar ministries and established a system for election of local government leaders. However, the advent of

the cold war prevented that process from being completed by extending it to the national level. Thus, many of the prewar bureaucrats who had been barred from government were now allowed to return to important policy-making positions in the party and the ministries. Therefore, many of the aspects of the Prewar bureaucratic rule pervaded the postwar government as well. With time, the old bureaucrats were displaced in party leadership by emerging local politicians who brought with them into office an agenda to cater to the needs and desires of their local constituency. The new leaders' overriding concern for constituent "pork barrel" issues led to an increased emphasis of local issues in the party and a decrease in concern for national issues. [Ref. 11: p. 121]

2. The System Today

a. *Intraparty Politics*

While the Japanese decision making systems bears many resemblances to the systems in place prior to the war, there are some significant differences which set it apart from the old system. First, there is increased stature and power vested in the office of Prime Minister. No longer a mere puppet of the Ministry heads, the Prime Minister is recognized as the legitimate head of the government. Second, is the important role that the intraparty politics of the LDP play in the policy-making process of Japan.

Intraparty politics create an important influence on the Prime Minister. To become Prime Minister one must first be the leader of one of the LDP factions and then be selected to head the government by gaining endorsement through consensus of the party faction leaders. Factions exist more because of "personal loyalty and political self interest" of the members than for differing camps of policy views. Therefore, they are of little direct significance in deciding policy matters. The important role they play is to limit the independence of the Prime Minister. In all issues the Prime Minister must consult all faction leaders to prevent eroding his coalition support in the party. This makes the Prime Minister a "leader of a sort of collective leadership," a "first among equals," if such a thing exists. [Ref. 12: p. 36]

Many have criticized the factions on the grounds that they weaken party unity, damaging the LDP's image with voters. They have also been accused of breeding corruption and financial dependence on big business. This point has been underscored by the rash of political scandals uncovered in Japan during the eighties. Even with the controversy that surround them, factions do seem to play an important role by providing some means of checks and balances, preventing the emergence of monolithic government. This is especially important in Japan where alternation of the party in power is rare. [Ref. 15: p. 46-48]

The American President certainly has concerns about political repercussions of his actions, but they are not as quick acting or as restrictive as those of concern to the Japanese Prime Minister.

b. Bureaucratic Politics

The high level officials of large Japanese government agencies and ministries appear to play a much more significant role in policy making than their counterparts in the U.S. Due to their positions and expertise in their respective areas these bureaucrats are at a considerable advantage over party leaders or cabinet members as a result of their access to pertinent and important information. In fact, elected government officials rely heavily on the bureaucracy for information. As a result, in matters of foreign policy or defense, the image of the world perceived by the government is created by the bureaucracy.

American government leaders have at their disposal separate and somewhat independent organizations from which they can draw information. The President is aided by the agencies which are part of the executive branch of the government and as such work directly for the President, e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense and State. The LDP does have organizations meant to provide information to decision makers such as the Foreign Affairs Research Committee

and the Policy Affairs Research Council. However, in practice these groups do little independent research. Their main role has been to analyze the documents prepared by ministry officials and to pass them on with little or no changes. [Ref. 7: p. 125]

c. Business Influence

As Japanese business has become more internationalized its interests in foreign policy as well as many other areas of government has become more intense. In recent years this increased interest has translated into involvement by business leaders in the decision-making process. Often they exert influence indirectly through the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or by contacts with party faction leaders. However, today they are becoming more directly involved in policy process.

Japanese politics in the nineteen eighties can best be characterized by the emergence of the private sector onto the political scene. Japanese business derives much of its new-found political clout from the extensive market liberalization and relaxation of many governmental regulations which had previously aggressively guarded by politicians. In the early eighties the U.S. led the way in market liberalization. Forces in the maturing Japanese economy sought the same type of freedom for competitive growth. However, with the subsequent increase in economic interdependency came a new

desire to maintain national identity. National defense thus became a growing symbol of national identity and as such, received significant budgetary increases throughout the decade, greatly as a result of the influence of the private sector. [Ref. 19: p. 271-272]

One recent defense issue in which business leaders were intimately involved was the debate surrounding the joint U.S.-Japanese project to produce a combat aircraft, the FSX. This debate placed the Japanese defense industry at the center of the controversy and negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. The industry lobbied aggressively for domestic production of the aircraft on the basis of overall cost saving and incorporation of technologies in which they claimed to be ahead of the American companies. [Ref. 24: p. 465] This effort by Japanese industry to intervene in sensitive defense related negotiations set a precedent which is likely to continue.

The interaction and power sharing relationships of these three groups have been explained in the literature in what has been called "the elite model." As described by Haruhiro Fukui;

> Businessmen and bureaucrats in turn both need and depend on each other and the LDP. Businessmen collectively want to see the capitalist free-enterprise system continued and consequently work to keep the conservatives in power. Individual businessmen and various business sectors are also interested in having particular legislative bills promoted or blocked in the Diet in accord with their best interests. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, look to the LDP politicians for actions favorable to them in budget appropriations and jurisdictional aggrandizement. Furthermore, many senior bureaucrats hope to enter politics after early retirement, and the friendship of influential politicians is important to them. Other

> retiring officials seek to find jobs in private firms and for this reason they cultivate friendship of their clients while still in office by manipulating their regulatory and licensing authority. These three groups are thus seen to compliment each other, forming a natural and happy alliance. [Ref. 4: p. 24]

The tenets of democracy in Japan dictate that many different voices are heard in government. As in every democracy, a measure of efficiency in decision making is forgone to allow for all interested parties to be heard and for the political process to finally produce the policy most representative of the will of the people and nation. In the Japanese system the extremely broad power base inherent in the political and governmental structure magnifies the burden created by these democratic inefficiencies. The Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office once made the following observation about the prewar Japanese decision-making system, likening the system to the Japanese custom of carrying a light, portable wooden shrine called a Mikoshi;

> The general direction is not in doubt, but the speed and the manner of progressing is the resultant of thrusts from one side and counter thrusts from the other side. The shrine sways widely from one side of the road to the other - backs and fills - sometimes it stays poised and stationary, sometimes it lands the entire party in the ditch. But the bearers all know where they are going and sooner or later that is where they will take the shrine. [Ref. 7: p. 122]

Although the military is no longer the preeminent bureaucratic power that it was before the war, the Japanese style of governing continues to bear a striking resemblance to the Mikoshi style of prewar Japan.

B. DEFENSE DECISION MAKING

The Japanese defense policy-making process, like the process in the U.S., is extremely complex with many parties involved and exerting influence. The process reflects the general characteristics of Japanese policy making with its own peculiarities and interested players. A more in-depth look at the players and the process will provide a better opportunity to understand its dynamics and limitations.

1. The Process: Theory and Fact

The three major classifications of decisions which need to be made in regard to defense and the mechanism by which they should be made are;

- "Measures decided and put into effect by the Defense Agency itself."
- "Important items (such as basic policies for defense, outlines for national defense programs, advisability of defense operation etc.) drafted by the Dense Agency and decided on by the cabinet after consultations with the National Defense Agency which are put into effect by the Defense Agency."
- "Items on which opposition parties present opinions during Diet deliberations, with decisions reached through government...replies to the opposition interpellation." [Ref. 9: p. 56]

These decisions can have a significant effect on the territory of almost all of the major ministries. Thus, the process becomes very obscure as it tries to make defense policy fit into the overall framework of the government, catering as much as possible to the needs and wants of competing interests. [Ref. 9: p. 57]

In contrast with the U.S., very little of the decision-making process in Japan can be seen by the outsider. It has been estimated that at least 70 percent of the process is invisible to the external observer. Much decision making in Japan is influenced by a culture of bureaucracy with hundreds of years of tradition, with formal rules never having been written down or codified. The official process of government contains little substance of the true process, so little, in fact, that the Diet has been called "ceremonial" where "Everything is decided before a bill is tabled." [Ref. 13: p. 151] Thus, a true understanding of the public and governmental decision making system is difficult to obtain. And this is certainly more the case for non-Japanese. Naohiro Amaya, a former MITI vice minister has said;

> We cannot objectively explain our decision-making system to the outside world. Even Japanese don't understand it. It's like the brain of a child that grows up as the child grows.

We may not be able to fully grasp all of the subtleties and complexities that affect the defense decision-making system of Japan, but a good start at obtaining some important and useful insight would be to define the major participants in the process and their relationships.

2. The Major Players

a. The Japan Defense Agency

Bureaucratic politics play a major part in all aspects of Japanese government, but nowhere is this more true

than in the area of defense policy making. This leaves the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) at a distinct disadvantage since, even though it is charged with the creation and execution of defense policy, it is not the most powerful player in the policy formulation process.

Without question, the JDA has improved its stature within the government in recent years. Created as a small agency under the complete control of the National Police Agency and the prewar Interior Ministry, it has grown to be a well-established organization attracting many qualified professionals who make a meaningful contribution to the decision-making process. However, it still maintains its agency status and thus is at a significant disadvantage while bargaining with the major bureaucratic powers of large ministries.

Its position and status in the bureaucratic structure thus presents the JDA with three obstacles as it attempts to fulfill its role in the policy process.

> "From the Japanese cultural tradition that places great emphasis on consensus, it must seek to lead, but carefully, within the limits of a system that prizes conformity over charisma, uniformity over individuality, and evolution over revolution. From its parliamentary tradition it must seek to make policy advances in the Cabinet and National Defense Forums where it is not a major actor." [Ref. 9: p.58-59]

b. The Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance (MOF), as the most powerful ministry in postwar Japan, has widespread interests in all aspects of government activities. All government agencies, including the JDA, must negotiate their annual budgets with the MOF. Therefore, a large portion of direct resource allocation decisions are made within the MOF. The MOF's stance on defense has been one of preventing a departure from the traditional approach of a balanced defense, which does not necessarily depend heavily on "forces in being." By which is meant physical weapons and force structure, instead emphasizing intangible and indirect forces such as economic and diplomatic power.

A basis for the MOF's continual influence over defense matters is the existence of officials with prior experience on the MOF in the JDA. This provides the MOF with important links to the JDA and access to information on future developing projects or priorities in the JDA which it uses to weigh defense expenditures against all of the other competing government interests. [Ref. 9: p. 60]

c. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is the second most powerful ministry. Its main direct concern and influence in regard to defense policy is in weapons development decisions and thus it can have a major

influence over shaping the very nature of the JDA and the weapons that it has at its disposal to carry out its mission. Another central issue facing MITI, on which it has in the past taken opposing sides, is that of cooperation in technology sharing and domestic production of advanced systems.

Like the MOF, MITI has ben a leading advocate for the development and employment of "soft power" to enlarge japan's role in the international security structure. Thus, MITI has pushed policies to increased economic and financial interdependence, allowing market forces to shape the actual relationships. The growing role of the Bank of Japan as the monetary policy regulator for Pacific Asia is one example of this policy in action. MITI has made Japanese industrial and financial competitiveness the true measure of Japanese power, diminishing the role of and, according to its policy objectives, the need for military power. [Ref. 19: p. 270-271]

d. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In comparison to its relationship to the other more powerful ministries, the relationship of the JDA with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has been more favorable for the JDA. As early as 1978 the JDA recommended the abolition of the security division of the American Affairs Bureau which would place the full responsibility for security matters with the JDA. This assault on policy territory once considered

inviolate by other ministries was one indication that the JDA was growing in confidence and support and was beginning the transformation into a policy player in its own right.

The MOFA reacted by creating a security planning committee in which it vested the responsibility of formulating comprehensive security policy for the Foreign Ministry. Since that time and primarily in the early eighties, the relationship shifted from confrontational to a situation in which they have found "themselves agreeing more often than not." [Ref. 9: p. 62]

e. The National Defense Council

The National Defense Council is a body consisting of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, JDA Director, and the Economic Planning Agency Director General. Its function is to provide a forum for negotiations between the various defense policy stake holders. It has frequently been the venue of bureaucratic "ambushes" of the JDA when it presented its proposals for consideration. [Ref. 9: p. 63]

James Morley, a Columbia University professor has noted, "The government of Japan is administered by bureaucracies rather than bureaucracy, with each of the separate bureaus being competitive with all the other bureaus." The NDC is the embodiment of this observation.

f. The Liberal Democratic Party

The Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) of the LDP has the primary responsibility for policy formulation and initiation within the party. A number of committees and subcommittees, commissions and divisions representing all the departments of government operate within the council on the broad policy issues relevant to their area of concern and expertise, but rarely getting involved in the specific issues associated with particular pieces of legislation. The most important of these bodies are divisions and commissions which are usually headed by senior party officials. [Ref. 12: p. 113] From the committees, commissions and divisions the policy recommendations are passed upward to the Executive Council where they are reviewed and debated before being passed along further to the Cabinet for its endorsement before presentation in the Diet.

These divisions and commissions play several important roles in the overall policy formulation process. First, they provide a service to Diet members by educating them about policy issues. Often, politicians have little or no expertise in the area in which they are expected to make policy. This also provides Diet members an opportunity to establish an important network of ties with the bureaucrats who are the real experts.

Secondly, activity in the commissions and divisions provides Diet members with tangible evidence of their

involvement in the policy-making process for the benefit of their constituents who want to be assured that their representative is working for their interests.

Thirdly, the organizational structure of the divisions and commissions provides a framework to provide party members with powerful key positions. Since all legislation must be approved by the divisions and it is impossible to gain the consensus necessary for successful passage in the Diet without support from the commission, the leaders of these organs are major players in the policy process. As such, they exercise what has been come to be called *zoku* power. [Ref. 12: p. 114]

The literal translation of the term *zoku* is "tribe" or "clan." The term is used to refer to a senior Diet member who, by virtue of his experience, position or party and government connections is recognized as being consistently influential with the ministry responsible for the area of his concern. The term *"zoku giin"* is used to refer to a member of this elite group, with *"giin"* meaning "Diet member."

> The key fact about the concept is that it deals with policy making in Japan which, like many other aspects of Japanese life, is divided between the formal and informal, the *tatemae* (what is apparent or "up front") and the *honne* (the reality behind the scenes). The formality is what occurs in the Diet to legitimize the law. The informality is the role of the LDP's Policy affairs Research council in considering proposed legislation before it goes to the Diet. The even more informal is what the *zoku giin* do to control the PARC, particularly when more than routine change, or critical budget decisions, is involved. [Ref. 8: p. 164]

The growth of *zoku* influence in LDP politics in recent years points to an important development in the decision-making process and the Japanese style government as more and more LDP members seek to increase their influence by narrowing their focus to a specific field of expertise. In the past, individuals trying to have impact in dealing with broad issues were often powerless as simply another voice in the crowd. Specialization and organization have given party leaders the legitimacy and credibility needed to make themselves heard when the debate is about their specialty.

The defense-related groups that work in the committees and subcommittees of the Policy Affairs Research council are the National Defense Division, the Security Affairs Research Council, and the Foreign Affairs Research Council. These groups actively pursue contacts with the JDA on many levels for the most current and relevant information vital to ensuring that their viewpoint prevails in the constant debate in defense policy formation.

One problem for the defense groups in the LDP, including the JDA, is the difficulty these groups have in attracting experienced and recognized party leaders into their key leadership positions. Attracting such talent is one of the most important ways that an organization within the party can increase its power base. Since the positions in the JDA and defense-related organs have been relatively lacking in prestige and influence, these leadership positions

historically have not been very sought-after by high-ranking party officials. But, with the passage of time, and with the growing reputation of the JDA, the prospects of an increasingly influential leadership in important defense-related positions in the party will increase as the JDA grows its own crop of rising defense experts and more non-defense bureaucrats find defense positions more attractive.

g. The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister is certainly a significant contributor in the defence decision process, but, typically much less so than an American President. Since defense matters infringe on essentially all ministerial and factional policy territories in one way or another, the Prime Minister's limitations in flexibility and policy latitude are especially severe. The barriers presented by the system were even enough to stifle Prime Minister Nakasone, an avowed revisionist and proponent of increased military spending. During his term he did make some efforts, with some success, such as penetrating the one percent of GNP ceiling for defense spending established by Prime Minister Miki in 1976. But the resulting defense budget of 1.004 percent of GNP can hardly be seen a major reversal of traditional Japanese defense policy. His caution also prevented him from raising the issue of constitutional revision during his entire term. Instead he

promoted a vague policy intended to "settle prewar accounts." [Ref. 12: p. 36]

The Prime Minister's main power in defense policy setting has been to influence it at the margins. Occasionally, however, the Prime Minister has had a major impact on defense. One such example occurred in the 1981 budget debate when the JDA and the MOFA had both asked for a 9.7 percent increase in the JDA budget. Prime Minister Suzuki closed the matter to debate with the comment, "The way of thinking of the administration officials concerned that a crack will appear in U.S. relations unless a 9.7 percent is taken is mistaken." [Ref. 9: p.67] With this simple statement the Prime Minister was able to slam the door on drastic increases for defense spending. His position, which allowed him international contacts with U.S. and other heads of state, gave him the leverage he needed to dismiss the arguments presented by the JDA and the MOFA.

Although these may be the most important actors in the actual decision-making progress, many more players, including business, the press, public policy think tanks and others have direct or indirect influence on, if not the process itself, the direction and eventual outcome of public policy process. There is no single pattern of decision making in Japan. But, a knowledge of the major players affords some insight useful in establishing more meaningful relationships with Japan.

IV. JAPANESE RESPONSE TO THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

A. BACKGROUND

The crisis in the Persian Gulf of 1990-91 provided an excellent insight into Japan's current attitude toward defense and on the Japanese government's ability to create policy and react to crisis. The background provided in the previous chapters establishes a foundation for understanding what went on during the debate in Japan over the formulation of a Japanese response to the crisis.

The Gulf War appeared to shock the Japanese people and their traditional view of their international position and role. Uncertainty and debate about defense have been a constant throughout Japan's post war period. However, recent events have created a groundswell of unrest and reexamining of basic arguments on all sides of the defense debate.

Until now, it has been regarded throughout modern Japanese society as taboo and sure political suicide for Japanese officials to consider or discuss Japanese involvement in foreign conflicts such as the Gulf War. The crisis clearly struck a nerve both in Japan and in the U.S. Apparent in Japan was a public and a vocal disdain for American aggression and, in the U.S., a feeling that Japan was seeking to avoid its responsibility by refusing to send troops to join the

coalition forces and by hedging on financial support for the allied operations.

While the U.S. effort enjoyed widespread public support at home, with 86 percent of Americans supporting the President's decision to go to war, a survey conducted in Japan two weeks after the start of the war indicated that 32.9% of the Japanese interviewed supported President Bush's decision while 47.3% opposed it outright. [Ref. 16: p.2] Thus, there was a strong anti-Bush, anti-American, anti-war viewpoint held by many of the people of Japan.

In his opening speech at an extraordinary session of the Diet in October 1990, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu described the Persian Gulf crisis as;

> ...the severest trial that has faced our country since the end of World War Two, a trial that urges us to decide how Japan should contribute to the world as a peace-loving state...Japan must not be a mere onlooker.

Many Japanese would tend to agree with him.

> The realization that it is not enough to contribute to the international community only in pecuniary and material terms, that Japanese have to make a more personal commitment - has become more or less a national consensus. The question is: exactly how?....with American soldiers standing ready to defend international justice at the risk of their lives, Japan found it difficult to refuse U.S. demands for a contribution more visible than cold cash. [Ref. 14: p. 11]

The debate is not about whether Japan ought to be an international participant. The questions that remain concern how Japan is to actually implement the objectives set out in the preamble of the Constitution, "....to occupy an honored

place in....international society," while still upholding the popularly supported pacifist ideals of the constitution.

The pacifist philosophy permeating Japanese public opinion has created, in Japan, a status quo which has led the public to shun military and security questions.

> As laudable as this position is, it has nonetheless given many Japanese an excuse to consciously avoid thinking about war or military matters. And shutting out war has led to an inability on the part of Japanese to squarely face the stark reality that in the past, force has been used to solve international disagreements and today it can still effectively halt disputes.
>
> I believe Japanese need to realize that the renunciation of war does not eliminate the need to think about security or armed forces. A viable pacifist policy cannot exist without some knowledge of arms and hostilities on the part of its proponents. Lacking a cool assessment of reality, an anti-war policy becomes little more than wishful thinking. [Ref. 17: p.142]

In the Gulf, it was clear that significant Japanese interests were at stake just as they were for the U.S. and other industrialized nations. The Japanese government, in an effort to bolster its shrinking international stature and U.S. relations, finally committed 13 billion dollars to the coalition forces. [Ref. 26: p. 44] Two billion dollars were promised in August 1990 and another nine billion in January 1991 with another two billion for economic support of nations affected and damaged by the war. [Ref. 18: p. 130] The internal political struggle which ensued as the Japanese government and the public grappled with the question of what their nation's role should be in this type of conflict is

instructive and reflects that the defense debate is far from over.

Several proposals were considered by the Kaifu government in response to the Gulf crisis. One proposal which was presented to the Diet as new legislation was The United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill (UNPCB). The bill would have allowed the deployment of SDF forces to trouble spots like the Persian Gulf in support of U.N. sanctioned peace-keeping and military actions. The bill created a stir of controversy in an extraordinary Diet session convened October 12, 1990, facing swift and major opposition from both of the major opposition parties and even from within the ruling conservative LDP party [Ref. 14: p. 6] By November 10 the bill still had not passed, leaving Kaifu and his government searching for an alternative means of quelling the growing international pressure, which resulted in a cabinet order in January 1991, directing SDF transport planes, ambulances and mine sweeping vessels to the Gulf. The bill itself was somewhat contradictory in that it stipulated that SDF forces would not face "armed threat or employ force of arms while conducting operations with U.S. and allied forces which were conducting all operations based on the assumption of eventual outbreak of hostilities." [Ref. 14: p.11]

B. ANALYSIS

1. Major Forces at Work

The major forces at work to form the Japanese response to the crisis were; 1) U.S. pressure for increased contributions, including the dispatch of SDF forces to join the allied forces, 2) The opposition parties supporting their traditional stance of strict constitutional interpretation, and 3) Public opinion strongly opposed to military involvement.

a. U.S. Pressure

In the earliest days of the crisis, immediately following the August 2 invasion of Kuwait, the government of Japan was one of the first in the international community to take decisive action against Iraq by ceasing all imports from and exports to Iraq, prohibiting all investments and economic cooperation. However, from that point forward, all real action from Japan came about as a reaction to pressure from abroad (mainly from the U.S.) to increase its contribution.

Much of the pressure exerted was by direct telephone calls from President Bush to Prime Minister Kaifu. It was over the telephone that Bush initially asked for financial contributions resulting in a one billion dollar commitment on August 29, 1990, and then an additional three billion on September 14. [Ref. 14: p. 10]

It was U.S pressure as well that prompted the government to propose the UNPCB in October. Congress made its

desires well known to the Japanese. Statements like that of Congressman Riegle in which he said that what Americans wanted to see was Japanese and German boys fighting in the trenches right along side American boys [Ref. 20: p. 289] indicated to the Japanese government that cash contributions would not be enough this time to satisfy the international community and above all the Americans.

b. Party Politics

In recent years, there has been a slow but steady movement in the major opposition parties, namely the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the Komeito (clean government) party, toward a more conciliatory stance on defense, at least in their position regarding the legitimacy and the existence of the SDF. Now they recognized the SDF's existence in a type of de facto approval of their mission and of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. [Ref. 19: p. 268] However, the issue of whether to send SDF forces to aid the allied effort once again raised old questions of constitutional interpretation and the legality of Japanese involvement in foreign conflicts.

The debate that ensued in the Diet over the UNPCB turned out not to concentrate on what could be done to respond to the crisis. Few questions were posed regarding the significance of the crisis to the whole world and what the appropriate Japanese response should be, or whether or not the

UNPCB met the needs of the situation, or if Japan would be able to follow through with such a response. Instead, the overriding concern was what could not be done. The central question of the entire debate was the constitutionality of the UNPCB.

> "In the Diet's eyes there existed neither the world nor the Persian Gulf but only the sacred and inviolable Article nine of the constitution, the protection of which was set before each member as a test of theological purity, paralyzing each in its magic spell." [Ref. 20: p. 278]

The stalemate in the debate was a result of first, the staunch view of the opposition demanding traditional interpretation and second, the failure of the Kaifu government to call for a new interpretation of the Constitution. Fearing a constitutional showdown, Kaifu tried to propose the UNPCB within the context of the traditional constitutional interpretation, which amounted to trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Had the government proposed the bill with the understanding that its approval would mean a significant change in Japan's traditional position, it probably still would not have passed. But, at least the debate would have dealt with more substantive questions which would have "aroused the Japanese to a sense of their international mission and awareness of national security." [Ref. 20: p. 278]

Part of the reason for the Kaifu government's failure to take a strong and decisive stand in the debate was due to the fact that the LDP was severely divided on the issue

of SDF deployment. Party Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa argued that existing law allowed SDF personnel to be dispatched overseas provided they were involved in a "peaceful purpose of protecting Japanese citizens." [Ref. 21: p. 6] Others demanded amendment of current law to specifically allow noncombatant personnel to be deployed. Still others argued for no restrictions at all on SDF deployments. [Ref. 21: p. 6]

The trend in recent years, as the LDP has become more factional, has been for the Prime Minister to come from smaller factions, representing a smaller fraction of party power making the task of creating consensus in the party even more difficult. In normal conditions, when dealing with much less controversial issues it has taken a substantial amount of time for the Prime Minister to create the consensus needed to overcome the opposition. This task is even more difficult now that the LDP no longer commands the majority in the House of Councilors (upper house).

In this case, haste prompted the government to bypass the normal procedures of deliberations in the divisions and commissions of the Policy Research Council, which is an important step in the creation of party consensus. It is at this level where most of the important players in the defense decision-making process (ie. the ministries, the JDA, business leaders and others) make their most significant inputs. The UNPCB was created, for the most part, behind closed doors in private meetings between Kaifu and several "priministerial

insiders." The results were disastrous when the bill went before the Diet. Without having subjected the bill to internal party scrutiny and debate, the Government found itself unprepared to answer questions during the debate without one bureau chief contradicting the testimony of another or simply not having the information necessary to satisfy the concerns of the Diet members. This created the feeling that the LDP was not unified behind the bill and thus, any chance of gaining the partial opposition support necessary for passage was destroyed. [Ref. 14: p. 10]

LDP party leadership did enjoy more success in gaining needed opposition support for financial contributions to the allied forces. The LDP gained the support of some of the Komeito party by incorporating some of that party's policy preferences which included not raising taxes on tobacco and to slightly reduce the defense budget to pay for the contributions. Also, the LDP agreed to lend its backing to a Komeito party member in the upcoming mayoral race in Tokyo. This was disturbing to many of the rank and file members of the Komeito party whose core supporters are members of the lay Buddhist organization Soka Gakki that has maintained a pacifist orientation in recent years. [Ref. 19: p. 259]

Here again, as is evident throughout Japanese politics, the importance of consensus, or the lack there of, was the determining factor in policy making. The decision-making structure, adapted to the culture and attitude of the

Japanese society, does not function well outside of its normal procedures and precedents. Party and bureaucratic politics rule and tradition remains as the hallmark of the system.

c. Public Opinion

Public opinion polls may not reflect the public's precise attitude on a particular subject, especially over time. Their unreliability generally results from poor or nonspecific questions or the employment of nonrigid statistical techniques. With that in mind, it is still notable that all of the polls conducted in Japan during the crisis strongly suggest that the pacifist tradition of the Japanese people continues to thrive. However, there was evidence of greater public recognition of the need for Japan to contribute in some way to international security. It appears now that the Government and the opposition parties failed to recognize and act on this new dimension of the Japanese public's understanding and desire.

A national telephone poll was conducted in October by the Kyodo News Agency in which 1000 people were asked "what do you think if the UNPCB?" Fifty percent of the respondents indicated that they were opposed the UNPCB and about 13 percent were in favor of it. When asked, "What do you think of dispatching Self-Defense Forces abroad?" about 67 percent were opposed and again about 13 percent were in favor. However, when these same 1000 people were asked, "In what form do you

think Japan should contribute in the future to world peace and the resolution of conflicts?" About 55 percent thought that monetary and material aid were not enough and that Japan should contribute some sort of "personnel aid" as well. It should be noted though that 82 percent of those expressing the need to send personnel to aid in conflicts qualified that to mean personnel in strictly noncombat support roles. [Ref. 20: pp. 280-281] The results of this poll were consistent with others conducted on the same subject throughout the months the months of the conflict. [Ref. 21: p. 6]

On the matter of financial support of the multinational effort, public opinion was more divided. Polls conducted in late January to early February 1991 by *Tokyo Shimbun*, *Nihon Kenzai Shimbun*, and *Asahi Shimbun* indicated that 51 to 53 percent of those polled expressed some type of disapproval or "strong objection" with 36 to 39 percent expressing approval of the contributions. [Ref. 18: p. 133]

The impact that public opinion had on the decision process was significant. However, it is possible that the public opinion perceived by the government and opposition parties as the traditional hard line pacifist stance was instead, a more mature, global view with more appreciation for Japan's global role and responsibilities. The failure of the UNPCB may not have been due to the desire of the Japanese to guard themselves from all involvement in foreign conflicts. It may have been more due to the failure on the part of the

Government to recognize the true desires of the Japanese people and to present a proposal reflecting these desires. Few, if anyone, in the international community expect Japan, at this point, to take part directly in foreign conflicts. [Ref. 23: p. 19] The nation is simply not ready for that step. However, the Japanese people appear to be willing to fill some more ambitious roles even if the government fails to acknowledge it.

2. Summary

There appear to be in Japan several contradictory forces that have created a paradoxical status quo in defense policy. First, there is the generally pacifist public that takes the peace constitution for granted "without really considering what war and peace really are." [Ref. 17: p. 143] Next is the passionately pacifist, liberal press who continually fuel the fires of pacifism. Lastly there is a government that has placed placation of U.S. demands and preservation of friendly U.S.-Japanese relations ahead of all or most other foreign policy concerns. The paradox rests in the fact that despite the public's pacifist feelings, *Asahi Shiblum* and government surveys show that the majority of Japanese still fully sanction the Governments's actions in building the SDF forces into the world's third most costly military force. The public, either out of ignorance or tacit approval of government policy, have let the issue of defense

and security take a back seat to other more pertinent issues in the national policy debate. [Ref. 17:p. 143]

Gulf War and its effect on Japan is significant in several respects. First, the crisis forced into the open a debate that places Japan at an important moment in its history. The outcome from this debate will set the new pattern for Japanese international cooperation. Second, it provided new and revealing insights into the state of Japanese public sentiment on defense and international responsibility. Pacifism still reigns. But, a growing awareness of global responsibility and equity is apparent. Third, it showed that the Japanese style of governing works best when it is allowed to function slowly and methodically as intended. Attempts to force rapid policy change outside of normal procedures or time constraints result in frustration.

V. CONCLUSION

A. QUESTIONS

Several questions directed the research efforts at the start of this study. Returning to those questions we can, with some new perspectives, shed some new light on the issues initially raised.

1. Japan's Role

Our first questions sought to more fully understand Japan's role in the security scheme of the newly emerging international order.

At this point, it appears that Japan's role in the international security structure is not yet fully defined. The recent events in Japan relating to the Persian Gulf Crisis indicate that the debate goes on both in and out of Japan. But within that debate there are several clear trends. First, the Japanese government is committed to preserving U.S.-Japanese relations and, thus, is willing to make great concessions to American demands even at the expense of severe criticism and political damage at home. Second, the pacifist ideal is still the foundation of the public stance on defense, although there are indications of a greater understanding of international responsibility on the part of the Japanese public.

2. Internal Forces

The second set of questions attempted to analyze, to the extent possible, the inner workings of the Japanese system of policy making. This understanding is vital to all who have to deal with the Japanese in official or unofficial capacities. But, it is especially important that U.S. defense negotiators and planners appreciate the intricacies of the Japanese system due to the sensitivity of the issues involved between the U.S. and Japan. There are several things that we can expect from the Japanese system and many things that we should not expect. This is important to understand to establish realistic expectations and reliable predictions of Japanese response to American requests.

a. What to Expect

First, we can expect stability. If anything characterizes Japanese society and its government it is the desire for stability. Although it may often appear divided, stressed and at times even confused, there is, in Japan, a common thread of concern for democratic and cultural ideals which tend to bind the nation into a unified force.

We can expect a continuing desire on the part of the Government and the public to preserve the long-standing friendship and cooperation with the U.S. Most in Japan recognize the importance of it. Many differences remain

between the nations, but none represent a crisis as long as communication remains amiable and positions remain flexible.

We can expect the pacifist tradition to endure and be the guiding principle for Japanese foreign Policy for the foreseeable future. It is important for Americans and others in the international community to understand that the pacifist ideal is a fact of life of Japan, woven into the psyche of the nation. Whether the constitution is ultimately revised or not, pacifism is the political reality of Japan. No amount of bullying or "bashing" from other nations will change that.

b. What Not to Expect

We should not expect to impose policy on the Japanese solely to achieve U.S. objectives and U.S. views of the proper objectives of the Japanese. Even though much of U.S.-Japanese relations over the postwar period has been characterized by such attempts, those days are coming to a close as Japan's power grows.

In any attempt to affect Japanese defense policy we should not expect quick results. Even if our strategy is better thought-out and truly congruent with the goals of the Japanese people, gaining the support for consensus takes time and perseverance.

3. U.S. Implications

The last questions posed in the introduction were meant to define the implications of Japanese security policy making on the U.S. and how best to handle Japanese relations in general.

First, it is important that Americans overcome the pro-Japan and anti-Japan syndrome that defines very black-and-white lines of cooperation and non-cooperation. We must learn to deal with Japan effectively and flexibly in all areas of policy, i.e., those areas where we enjoy a history of cooperation and mutual help as well as those where there is friction and competition. The key is to not let the competition detract from and cloud the overall cooperativeness of the entire relationship.

Clearly, key to this is the realization that significant differences do exist between the U.S. and Japan and to acceptance of these differences. Perhaps, neither system is better in absolute terms. Each is adapted to a society and a people that it serves and neither is likely to change much in the near future. The challenge will be to formulate a practical international security strategy of response and request which fits within the framework of the Japanese system and meets desires and needs of Japan as well as the U.S. and the rest of the world.

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